This paper describes the configuration and intermodule communication of a MULTImodule system for supporting Secure Authorization with Full Enforcement (MULTISAFE) for database management. A modular architecture is described which provides secure, controlled access to shared data in a multiuser environment, with low performance penalties, even for complex protection policies. The primary mechanisms are structured and verifiable. The entire approach is immediately extendible to distributed protection of distributed data. The system includes a user and applications module (IJAM), a data storage and retrieval module (SRM), and a protection and security module (PSM). The control of intermodule communication is based on a data abstraction approach, initially described in terms of function invocations. An implementation within a formal message system is then described. The discussion of function invocations begins with the single terminal case and extends to the multiterminal case. Some physical implementation aspects are also discussed, and some examples of message sequences are given.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

MULTISAFE
[48] is designed to provide securely controlled database access, and to do it in a way that (1) is verifiably secure, (2) does not incur a prohibitive performance penalty, (3) produces a modular system in accordance with the structured approach to design, provide "more apparent protection of information by providing physical control over that part of the system; information can flow in and out only over easily identified wires. This produces 'warm feelings' in the user of the system." It is at the logical level that evidence must be given that an architecture does indeed support data security. Unless communication among the system components can be shown to be logically secure (in terms of both message control and message content), security is not gained by isolation.
OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A data management system can be functionally divided into three major modules (a module being a combination of hardware and software):
(1) the user and application module (UAM), (2) the data storage and retrieval module (SRM), (3) the protection and security module (PSM).
Each one of these modules is treated as a separate and isolated process which is connected in a precise manner to the others to form the multiprocessing system called MULTISAFE.
In MULTISAFE all three modules function in a concurrent fashion. That is, the UAM coordinates and analyses user requests at the same time that the SRM generates responses for previous requests. Simultaneously, the PSM continuously performs security checks on all activities. Figure 1 illustrates the logical relationships among the three modules.
The modules of MULTISAFE are logically separated. The effect, of its logical separation on its physical separation (i.e., the implementation of the modules on ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 1983. A Modular Approach to Secure Database Management l 385 physically distinct processors) is not critical to security, but does improve performance by introducing actual concurrency. Simulation studies in [36] show 25-40 percent improvement in response time over conventional single-processor approaches under light workloads and up to 100 percent improvement under heavy workloads. Further discussion of implementation is deferred to Section 6.4.
The Protection and Security Module (PSM)
The PSM has much in common with some of the concepts reviewed in Section 1, in the sense that security mechanisms are encapsulated or isolated from other modules. On the other hand, the PSM also differs from most of those views, because the PSM is dedicated to security checking and is not mixed in with other operating system functions (e.g., I/O handling) or database functions. The PSM offers fine resolution (granularity) and, as a separate processor, can be sufficiently sophisticated to make data security checks in a way that can more precisely adhere to the complex protection policies needed for database systems. The PSM performs only security checks and does not perform database I/O.
The PSM can make access decisions based on three classes of dependency:
(1) data-independent, (2) data-definition-dependent, (3) data-value-dependent.
Data-independent access conditions can depend on user and/or terminal identification information and dynamic system variables, such as time of day and various kinds of system status information. Data-definition-dependent conditions involve attributes (relation and attribute names),' but not their values. For example, a user may have permission to access names and addresses (from an employee relation) but never salary information. Data-value-dependent conditions require the values of attributes to be checked. For example, no user may have permission to see the salary of anyone who has a value of "manager" for the "job title" attribute.
In addition, the PSM can perform other functions. Some of these are history keeping, audit trail generation, integrity checking, cryptographic processing, and backup/recovery control.
The User and Applications Module (UAM)
The UAM acts as an interface between the user and the system by reading and analyzing input queries and by formatting and displaying (or printing) results. It also provides working storage and computation for the user. All security and I/O routines are removed from the UAM and are completely isolated from the user. One exception is that the UAM will provide low-level primary memory management and protection for memory shared by multiple users with a single UAM. (This memory protection is accomplished by existing operating systems techniques and is not part of this present work.) Much of what is traditionally part of the operating system will execute within the UAM. 386 * R. P. Trueblood, H. R. Hartson, and J. J. Martin
The UAM differs from its counterpart in other proposed systems in the operations that are performed. For example, in the back-end system of Canaday et al. [8] the host performs security operations, whereas the UAM does not. In Bisbey and Popek's encapsulation approach [2] the central computer is allowed to do I/O operations, whereas the UAM is not.
There are several ways to view the UAM in a multiuser environment. First, the UAM can be viewed as a large conventional multiprogrammed processor, with several disjoint user address spaces. An alternative view is as a collection of very "intelligent" terminals each with its own private memory and processor. In this view some or all of the UAM resides in each of the terminals. With an intelligent terminal a user's software and local data buffers become physically isolated from those of other users.
The Storage and Retrieval Module (SRM)
The primary task of the SRM is to perform database accesses for the UAM and PSM. The SRM processor can be conventional computer hardware (minicomputer or large mainframe computer) and/or conventional DBMS software. It can also be a back-end processor or a database machine with specialized hardware for storage and retrieval operations.
Since the SRM resides on its own processor(s), it is also possible for the SRM to perform certain data manipulation operations in addition to data retrieval. That is, the SRM can compute SUM, COUNT, and AVERAGE, or other special functions, such as JOIN and PROJECTION, and materialization of views for a relational database.
In addition to managing database storage and retrieval operations, the SRM maintains private application files for non-DBMS users. That is, for a non-DBMS application program being processed by the UAM, the SRM performs the "simple" I/O operations on the file (e.g., reading next record on a tape), forcing all I/O to be controlled by a common set of mechanisms.
THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY MULTISAFE
MULTISAFE
provides secure, controlled access to shared data in a multiuser database environment. MULTISAFE serves two classes of users: authorizers and data accessers. Correspondingly, the PSM has two parts: the authorization process and the enforcement process. Although the authorizers are typically a subset of the data accessers, they are treated as a distinct set, since at any given time the roles will always be distinguishable. For both groups MULTISAFE provides secure log in and log out, including user identification and authentication. Initially, only one authorizer, the system administrator (SYSADMIN), exists. The SYSADMIN can designate users (create accounts) and, by issuing authorizations, can grant them access rights to various parts of the database. The SYSADMIN can also designate other authorizers.
The authorization process provides the ability to add, delete, modify, and display authorization information stored in the protection database (see Fig. 1 ). The right to make, modify, or see authorizations depends on the concept of "ownership." An authorizer becomes an owner of a subset of the database by being the one who creates and enters the data into the database. Another way is by being officially charged with the custody (granted ownership) of that particular part of the database, either by the SYSADMIN or by another owner of those data.
The protection database contains a collection of "authorizations." Each authorization represents an authorizer's specification of permission, given to an individual or a group of users, to make particular kinds of data access operations, on certain parts of the database, and under very specific conditions (system states).
The data accesser, if authorized to do so, can add, delete, modify, or display data in the database. The enforcement process responds to an accesser's request by consulting the authorization information, together with the state of the system, and making an access decision to allow or not allow the requested access operation to proceed.
ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITION OF SECURITY
Several assumptions that help to bring this work into focus are as follows.
Assumption 1: Controlled Physical Access. The system is accessed only via terminals. Consider that the system is physically protected by an impenetrable wall with small holes through which wires protrude to terminals in the outside world. Any information or signals can be sent in through those wires. If the modules of MULTISAFE are physically distributed, the equivalent of the impenetrable wall can be provided by antieavesdropping techniques such as encryption.
Assumption 2: PSM Programming Impervious to Modification. PSM programming is built into a programmable read-only memory (PROM). It is physically impossible for PSM programs to be modified by a user via a terminal.
Assumption 3: Correct User Identification. User identification (authentication) will be assumed to be done correctly. User identification is being treated elsewhere as a completely separate problem [18, 44, 121 . Furthermore, it is assumed that user identification can be reauthenticated whenever necessary or desirable, so that the relationship between user and terminal remains constant to MULTISAFE.
Assumption 4: Separation of Users in UAM. The UAM provides ordinary primary memory protection, so that multiple users are prevented from interfering with each other's processes, data, or messages.
Assumption 5: Limitation of Scope. Security in this work refers to access controls, and not information flow controls [13] or inference controls [29, 46, 47, 15, 14, 311 . The flexibility of a generalized PSM processor, though, admits to future consideration of these and other controls.
Assumption 6: Discretionary Access Control. Discretionary authorization (through which individual authorizers may specifically propagate access rights to shared data) is assumed, since it is a more general case than nondiscretionary authorization (in which all access decisions are based on security levels and classes), but this does not rule out nondiscretionary
policies. An important implication is that many users are typically also authorizers. All that follows, particularly the definition of security and its constituent conditions, applies to systems subject to the constraints of the preceding assumptions. The definition of data security in this work emphasizes security explicitly as a relationship between authorization and enforcement. Definition 1. A system is data secure if, in that system, the enforcement process allows the system to perform only those access operations which are specified by the authorizers.
At this point, it is useful to have a clear understanding of the term "access." In this work the following definition is used. The requirement of condition 4, that the SRM's response to an access request be correct, eliminates secondary trickery, such as a "Trojan horse" in the SRM trying to deceive the PSM by sending prohibited data disguised as the response to some other request. These four conditions, taken together, are the equivalent of Definition 1 as applied in MULTISAFE.
In this paper correctness of the authorization process and the enforcement process (conditions 1 and 2) are assumed. The formal model of authorization and enforcement found in [24] lays the groundwork for proving these processes to be correct. A formal proof of their correctness is not important in this paper, which is intended to introduce the architecture of MULTISAFE.
Conditions 3 and 4 are of interest here, as these deal with intermodule communication-message content and message paths-which controls the sequences by which modules invoke each other's functions.
INTERMODULE FUNCTION INVOCATION
In this section the problem of intermodule communication is abstracted to a discussion of function invocations, to eliminate implementation details involved in the message system that is used to deliver the caIls and returns from module to module. Discussion is first focused on a simple system that supports only one terminal, then the results are adapted to the general system of arbitrarily many terminals. In this abstracted view, the module interaction is simple and structured, so that a correctness proof becomes a straightforward exercise.
The Single-Terminal Case
The system discussed first is simplified in that it does not support simultaneous access of several users. Of course, many users can access the system and share data, but only through the same terminal and at different times. Discussing this simplified system first permits treatment of the enforcement mechanism for access rights independently of the problem of separating simultaneous users. Figure 1 reveals that the system is composed of a sensitive part (the SRM and its protected data) and a nonsensitive part (the UAM and the users), and the focus here is on the communication of the nonsensitive part with the sensitive one. The PSM can be interpreted as the gate to and from the sensitive part; all messages between the two parts have to pass through the PSM.
The basic pattern of information flow between the UAM/user portion of the system and the SRM is reflected in the following program executed by the PSM. The program is invoked upon a LOGIN request from the UAM and remains to be the monitor of all transactions until a LOGOUT request is received and executed. The function USERID determines, possibly by a probing conversation, the user's identity. It also informs the UAM whether the user has logged on successfully * FL P. Trueblood, H. R. Hartson, and J. J. Martin and, thus, established system occupancy. The variable ID, local to the PSM, is then used for all later security checks. The function USER-REQUEST prompts the user and obtains his next service request. If this is not a LOGOUT request, then it will be checked (by CHECKl) against the user ID to determine whether it is authorized.
Although some of the subprograms used in PSM-P converse either with the UAM (USER-REQUEST, RESPONSE, DENIAL) or with the SRM (SER-VICE), none converses with both; the only information path between the UAM and the SRM is established by the sequence Q := USER-REQUEST; CHECKl(Q, ID); R := SERVICE(Q); RU := EXTRACT(R, ID); CALL RESPONSE(RU);
In this sequence a security check is performed on both the information Q that enters the sensitive area and the information R that leaves it.
The security of the system is therefore determined by the properties of CHECK1 and EXTRACT. The correctness of these is assumed here (conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 1 in Section 41.
The Multiterminal Case
If more than one terminal is attached to the system, there is the problem of keeping interactions orginated by different terminals separate. This is partially accomplished by tagging all messages that belong to the interaction originated by a particular terminal t[i] with the identification of t[i], say, i. This identifier will be referred to as the terminal ID, or TID. It may be assumed, for example, that the UAM contains a polling loop that interrogates all terminals in turn, picks up existing messages, and tags them with the terminal identification code. These terminal IDS accompany all communication messages exchanged among the different modules and finally, for output messages, determine at which terminal the message is to be displayed.
In order to ensure that no confusion arises among the different processes, a mechanism is needed that uses the terminal IDS for controlling the association of messages and processes.
This mechanism will now be described. It has two important properties.
(1) It is transparent to the programs written for the different modules. This, for example, facilitates using the program PSM-P, described above, for a multipleterminal system without alteration. The advantage of maintaining the simplicity of PSM-P and, hence, its clarity and verifiability is obvious. (2) The mechanism is the same for all modules. Thus, verified once, its correctness is guaranteed wherever it is used.
The mechanism consists of a calling sequence (invoked by all function or subroutine references to programs in other modules), a return sequence (invoked by the return statement of a program that was called from another module), and a control loop. Each module owns a process table and an input queue, each needed by the communication mechanism but invisible to the other module programs. The input queue may accommodate the requirements of a priority scheduler and need not follow strict queuing discipline. It must store tuples, of either two or four components, used by the calling and returning sequences described below. Any module of the system may feed a queue, but only the module that owns it may inspect or remove members of a queue.
The process table permits a module to file the environment of a program (local variables, return address, etc.) under the terminal ID. The mechanism is now described informally, starting with the calling sequence. 
The Control Loop (Receiving). The control loop of module j (active only
if no other program is being executed in module j) removes the "next" item from its input queue (it waits if there is none). It then determines whether the item is a request from another module i to execute a function in module j or whether it is a response (to a previous request) from, say, some module k back to module j. (1) the return sequence is activated, which (2) enters the pair [terminal ID, result set] into the queue of the source (requesting) module i (recall that the terminal ID and the source module code are part of the function's environment), and (3) transfers control back to the control loop of module j.
The Control Loop (Returning)
. Again, the control loop of module i removes the next item from its input queue (see Fig. 5 ). If the item found is the response to a request, then the item is the pair [terminal ID, result set]. In this case the control loop of module i (1) reinstates the environment retrieved from the process table under the terminal ID, (2) deposits the result set at the place ordinarily used by functions for returning their results, and (3) transfers control to the return address (also retrieved from the process table). The coding of these intermodule communication operations is straightforward, and the verification of their correctness can easily be achieved by axiomatizing the queue and process table operations using the technique of algebraic specification [22] . There are two cases: one in which interaction of the new message with the previous ones is to be avoided and one in which that interaction is necessary. In the case in which the new message carries a new request, unrelated to the previous one, one wants to avoid any interaction between the two transactions. This can be accomplished by forcing the second message to have a different terminal ID by qualifying the terminal ID with the addition of a time stamp. The control loop (Fig. 3) creates a new environment for the new request, because of its different terminal ID. Now the two requests are treated independently. Since the communication mechanism is transparent to the program that invokes it, such a program has no means of discovering that more than one message from the same terminal is currently being processed.
In the second case, there are new messages to be sent, while an existing request is being processed, that are related to the existing request (e.g., part of a questionand-answer interchange between a module and the user). Here a coherent discourse is to be established among the series of requests and responses carried by the messages; that is, in this case interaction is necessary. The terminal IDS must be recognized as related; this recognition can be accomplished by ignoring the time stamp for this case. Normally, after processing of the first request in the sequence is "finished," its environment would be destroyed. In this case the process environment is retained by attaching a level number to the terminal ID. The calling sequence increments the level number before putting the information packet on the queue of the next module and the return sequence decrements it. The level numbers simulate a stack (possibly distributed over the process tables of several modules) that keeps track of process nestings. The purpose of this paper is to describe logical concepts, not to provide a blueprint for a physical implementation. Whereas more specific physical views are required to discuss performance and cost, a logical view is often most suitable for discussing security. An actual implementation will translate the logical view into one of several possible physical manifestations. This section provides an example of an implementation with physically separate processors. 
Procedure Calls as Messages
It has been suggested ( [35] , as described by Sturgis in [41] ) that message passing and procedure calling are essentially equivalent constructs for communication within a single processor system. The discussion in [41] further suggests that this duality between calls and messages may not apply as well to distributed systems. The apparent difficulty arises, for example, in a pipeline situation in which information flow continues in one direction. However, in any implementation, a response message or return to a call is eventually necessary, if only to acknowledge the request message or call (i.e., a pipeline eventually comes back to return the resulting data). If the messages or calls to not require an immediate reply, they can be stacked or nested and replies can be delayed until the requested data can be sent back to the requester. In such a case, the duality appears to stand. In MULTISAFE, procedure calls and returns are conveyed by messages (for requests and responses), but immediate responses are not required for request messages. Furthermore, there can be concurrency between those messages that are simple acknowledgments and those that contain data. (See the discussion in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.)
Messages of various kinds have been used in different ways to synchronize multiple processes within an operating system environment. Notable among this work is that of Brinch Hansen [3-71 and Hoare [27, 281 . A comparison of the monitor approach to control resource sharing and the movement of data via message passing is given in [19] , along with a discussion of several related issues. UNIX2 is an example of an operating system that uses both a low-bandwidth interprocess communication channel for messages and a high-bandwidth channel (shared pages) for larger amounts of data [43, 381; see Section 6.4 for a similar dual-channel approach in MULTISAFE.
Message passing is also used to communicate among processors in a loosely coupled distributed system [37] . In addition, some programming languages for concurrent processing use messages for synchronization [23] . Typed languages with special facilities for sending and receiving messages [30] are interesting to consider for the construction of a system such as MULTISAFE.
There are differences between the interprocess communication needs in the MULTISAFE environment and those of operating system environments. These are probably differences of degree, rather than of kind. A higher volume of data is conveyed in a database system-complex data access queries and a large amount of data being stored and retrieved. In operating systems the messages are often used to synchronize concurrent processes. Here we are applying the concept of message passing to carry requests and data among processors to provide secure data management.
There is, of course, a correspondence between the functional request and response roles of the messages (described in Section 6.6) and the call and return mechanisms of the procedures (described in Section 5). However, because the messages and the function calls are different kinds of abstractions, the correspondence is not one to one. In particular, it is useful for the PSM to remain "in ' UNIX is a trademark of Bell Laboratories. charge," that is, to "solicit" requests from the UAM with a USER,-REQUEST call. Then no unsolicited requests can be autonomously generated by the UAM. (In any event, it is generally the case in most systems that the system signifies its readiness to receive requests.) The user states his or her request (via the UAM) in the return to that call. The relationship between a request and its response is discussed further in Section 6.7, which concerns message sequences.
Message Structure
Messages are used to carry function calls (requests) and returns (responses) between modules. Recall the form of the function reference 4-tuple:
[terminal ID, parameter set, source module ID, function name].
The terminal ID, source module ID, and function name are short, fixed-length identifiers which are grouped together into a header called a "message descriptor." The parameter set contains variable-length textual material and comprises the "text" of a message. In cases in which the message is conveying large quantities of data, the textual part can be very long. However, inter-module message channels are likely to be of relatively low bandwidth. For performance reasons, then, it is convenient to send the text separately. In Figure 6 the two different types of paths, for message descriptors and for text, can be noted. A physical mechanism for safely transmitting text among modules is described in Section 6.4. It will be assumed thereafter that the text is free from tampering. Furthermore, no text can be transmitted without a proper corresponding message descriptor. The composition of the descriptor part is described below and the way in which these two parts are transmitted through the system is discussed in Section 6.4. After that, it is sufficient to consider only the descriptor and how it is transmitted through the system. The message descriptor is composed of three parts:
(1) a message classification, (2) a message identifier (or ID), (3) a message text address. The "message classification" is a numeric code (discussed in Section 6.6) that identifies, among other things, the source module and function name of the 4-tuple described in Section 5.2.2. The "message ID" contains unchangeable message identification markings which associate the message with a specific terminal ID. It can also contain information about user identification, job name, and so on, and even a time stamp to indicate when the message was initiated. The "text address" is the memory address of the message text. As an example of a message descriptor and text, consider a "call database" (CDB) message as illustrated in Figure 7 . The CDB message descriptor contains the classification code of 105 (explained later), the "message ID" that associates this CDB message with a particular user, and the text address of (or pointer to) the request tables constructed in the UAM memory. by virtual processes on a single hardware processor, its architecture is best described as a multiprocessor configuration composed of three separate processors which are connected to three separate primary random-access memory blocks. This system organization follows the concepts outlined by Enslow [17] for a multiport-memory organization with private memories. A multiport memory is a primary memory block with additional switching logic in its interface unit to allow access by more than one processor. The interface logic contains a priority arbitrator for resolving concurrent memory accesses. When a processor is connected to more than one memory, the ability to access any memory block is the same except for priority waits.
A memory block can be made "private" by connecting only certain processors to it, thereby providing physical separation between, for example, the user's memory and the PSM and SRM memories. In a virtual processor implementation, the multiport and private memory features can be emulated by controlling the way in which address spaces are shared.
Some implementation aspects are concerned mainly with performance. To illustrate, consider the flow of retrieved data among the modules. By expanding the multiport-memory switching logic somewhat, it is possible to achieve logical transfer of data from one primary memory to another without having actual physical movement of data. For example, a portion of SRM memory can be "lent" to the PSM, logically transferring its contents in a hardware-switched version of the way buffer pointers are exchanged within operating systems. It is the burden of the implementor to show conclusively that such a PSM-controlled switching mechanism is equivalent, in terms of security, to the logical view discussed in this paper.
The fixed-format descriptor is sent between modules via an "encapsulated" data type (involving the 4-tuples, the pairs, and the queues of Section 5.2). This means that its contents are set and checked only via defined operations which are invoked parametrically. No user or user process can directly access the representation details of message descriptors. The message text is also encapsulated, because it can be accessed only by the text address (a kind of capability to the text) contained in the message descriptor.
All message text is sent memory to memory within the private memory structure under the control of the PSM either by "PUSHing" (all outgoing text is deposited by the PSM into the UAM's or SRM's memory) or by "PULLing" (all incoming text is retrieved by the PSM from the UAM's or SRM's memory). The PUSH/PULL mechanism is represented by the double-headed arrows in Figure 6 and prevents any kind of access (read or write) by either the UAM or SRM to the PSM memory. The PUSH/PULL mechansim is to be contained within the hardware switching logic of the private multiport memories. None of the special hardware aspects of MULTISAFE have been implemented, but a multiprocess software version has been initiated.
The relationship between the PUSH/PULL mechanism and access decision binding times [26] is important. For example, it might be possible that the text of a legitimate message M from the UAM to the PSM be altered in the UAM into an illegitimate request Al', since the UAM is not completely verified and is also more open to inputs from other places in the system. If legitimate message M has passed security checking by the PSM, but M' (illegitimate) is the message that gets sent to the SRM for access, then an apparently allowable request is actually not legal. Thus, access checking should be delayed until the message is safely in the PSM. The message cannot be altered after it has been PULLed into the PSM, since the PSM will be verified and no other module can modify its memory contents. This approach ensures that the checked form of the request is the same form which is finally processed by the system, and the door to further tampering is closed.
Processing
Steps MULTISAFE functions in a multiuser environment. Each processor tries to remain busy. For the sake of fast response to legal requests, the basic philosophy is to assume that each incoming request is in fact a legal, authorized requestunless and until it is otherwise determined. The UAM and the SRM proceed to perform as many user-oriented and DBMS-functional operations as possible, independently from the PSM but without returning any information to the user or modifying the database in any way until they receive permission to do so from the PSM. The result is concurrency that is a combination of parallelism and pipelining.
It is now useful to trace the step-by-step processing of a single user request through MULTISAFE.
The numbers in parentheses in each step correspond to the numbers in parentheses in Figure 6 . A previous valid log-in is assumed to have been accomplished.
1. The user's request enters the UAM by (1) and is placed in the UAM memory through (2).
2. Next, the UAM performs syntax analysis on the user's request and constructs request tables for the SRM. 400 * R. P. Trueblood, H. R. Hartson, and J. J. Martin 3. When the PSM is ready to process a new query, it requests one from the UAM through (3). When step 2 is completed, the UAM responds with a notification through (3)-which is passed on to the SRM through (7)-that a user's request is ready for processing. The message which starts the SRM is a CDB (call database), which is similar to an SIO (start I/O) supervisor macro call in an operating system. At this point, the UAM enters a wait state (or begins processing another user's request) for the query results.
4. Next, the PSM extracts through (4) a copy of the request tables in the UAM memory, and through (8) places these tables into the SRM memory. The SRM begins database accesses.
5. Upon notification of the access request in step 3, the PSM retrieves from its database, through (6), the appropriate part of that user's authorization information-the security procedures and access conditions that apply to this request (predicates that determine access privileges). The PSM processor, through (5), begins the enforcement process as specified by the user's authorization information. If a security procedure requires additional information from the user, such as a password, then the PSM sends a message through (3) to the UAM. The UAM interrogates the user and returns his or her response to the PSM through (3).
6. While the SRM is busy at step 4, the PSM examines the copy of the request table through (8) and the access conditions through (5) to determine the need for data-independent and/or data-dependent checking. First, the PSM performs the data-independent checks, such as attribute name checking. Some of the things that can be checked are user ID, terminal number, time of day, and other status information. Some data-definition-dependent checking can be done here, also. For example, for a request in a query language like SEQUEL [lo], the relation names and selection and predicate attribute names can also be checked at this time. If data items for data-dependent checks are required, the PSM informs the SRM through (7) that additional data items are to be retrieved for security checking. A list of these data items is constructed in the SRM memory through 03).
7. After the SRM has received notification through (7) from the PSM about data items for data-dependent checks, the SRM initiates the retrieval for these items.
8. Data retrieved by the SRM are placed in the SRM memory through (lo), and the SRM processor performs any needed data manipulations on the retrieved data through (9).
9. When the SRM has prepared a set of data items (record or block), the PSM is notified through (7) . The SRM continues the retrieval process by collecting the next set of data items in another buffer area. That is, the SRM processing returns to step 8 unless the CDB is satisfied, or unless the PSM orders the SRM to halt because of an unauthorized access attempt.
10. After the SRM has notified the PSM as in step 9, the data are pulled through (8) from the SRM memory and into the PSM memory through (5) . The PSM examines the data through (5) and performs the data-dependent checks.
11. If access to the retrieved data is authorized, the PSM puts the data into the UAM memory through (3) and notifies the UAM of this action through (3) . At the same time, if this completes the CDB, the next query is requested from A Modular Approach to Secure Database Management l 401 the user. (For unauthorized access attempts, the PSM takes control and administers alarm and/or recovery procedures.) If this does not complete the CDB, the PSM returns to step 10 to get the next set of data from the SRM.
12. When the UAM has been notified by the PSM, as in step 11, it returns the results to the user through (1) .
From this processing flow, two processing loops can be identified. One loop is in the SRM, where steps 7,8, and 9 are repeated for each set of data (block) that is retrieved for the user. The other loop is in the PSM, where steps lo-12 are repeated for each block of data that is retrieved. These two loops are processed in parallel with each other.
Message Classification
A message is characterized by four attributes:
(1) class, (2) source, (3) t~get, (4) type.
Messages are grouped into two classes-request and response. The request class contains those messages that are calls for data or information. These messages require a response from their receivers. For each message there is a source (module), a target (module), and a message type. The source is the module that generates the message. The message target is the module that receives the message. The UAM, SRM, and PSM can each be a source and/or target module (depending on the other attributes). The user and authorizer have been subsumed into the UAM, since all messages from the user/authorizer are sent to only the UAM and all messages to the user/authorizer are from only the UAM. (This also eliminates any differences between interactive user-initiated queries and calls to the database from host programs executing on behalf of a user.) The message type identifies the function being called or returned. Authorization-type messages are those messages that inquire about or modify the authorization information in the PSM. Information-type messages request or return additional information needed by the PSM to make an access decision. The other types are more or less self explanatory. The range of each attribute is a finite set of values: CLASS = {request, response}; SOURCE = {UAM, PSM, SRM}; TARGET = {UAM, PSM, SRM}; TYPE = {log, access request, authorization, information}.
The set of all possible message classifications, MC, is given by the Cartesian product of the above four sets:
A specific classification is represented by the 4-tuple (c, s, 6 P), where c E CLASS, s E SOURCE, t E TARGET, andp E TYPE. The security constraints of the architecture are such that not every classification in MC is allowable in MULTISAFE.
For example, the UAM as a source is not allowed to send a message directly to the SRM as a target. There is a nonempty proper subset of MC which will be referred to as the secure message classification @MC) set. Each message classification in SMC is assigned a numeric code, called an SMC number, denoting the message classification. The request message class is given in Table I . The first column of the table gives the SMC number that is used in each message as the "message classification" of the message descriptor (Section 6.3). If the first digit of the SMC number is 1, the message belongs to the request class. The last two digits are sequence numbers used to identify the kind of request.
Messages in the response class, shown in Table II and identified by an SMC number with a first digit of 2, are answers to the messages in the request class. Notice also that the PSM is either the target or the source of every message, a necessary condition for all messages to go through the PSM.
Message Sequences
A message sequence is an ordered series of messages (calls and returns) among the modules of MULTISAFE, in response to a request from a user or an authorizer.
All message sequences are subject to two hinds of security checking: (1) checking specific to the request and (2) system occupancy checking. The specific check for a log-in request involves user identification, project name, etc., possibly augmented by password, authentication dialogues, etc. The specific check for a data request employs data-independent and date-dependent access conditions. System occupancy checks relate to overall permission to be an active user of the system, without regard to how it is being used. For example, the conditions (separate from user identification) for a given system user may be that occupancy is allowed only between 800 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. The system occupancy check is always, at a minimum, made in conjunction with log-in. System occupany checking at data request time provides an (optional) additional binding time for these conditions.
Within a message sequence every request message has a response. A request and its response form a request-response pair. It is possible for request-response pairs to be nested within other pairs. For example, a user's request to log-in may contain another pair of messages such as the request-response for a password before a log-in response is given. Even though nesting of message pairs is a key building block used in the construction of message sequences, not every message sequence is composed of nested pairs. Message sequences can alao have nonnested adjacent pairs. Furthermore, although requests and responses can always be paired up, in practice several responses may pair up with the same request. This is because responses containing large amounts of data must be broken up and sent back a block at a time, each block being part of the response to the same request. But, logically, the blocks can be viewed as a single response. An example is given in Section 6.7.1.
The request-response pairs of a message sequence are illustrated in Figure 8 . The arcs in the figures represent the directed messages, flowing from source to target. The numbers on arcs correspond to the SMC numbers of Tables I and II. Request-response pairs are identified by the commonality of the last two digits of their SMC numbers. The nesting of some pairs is illustrated by nested arcs. For example, in Figure 8a the pair (104,204) is nested within the pair (101, 201). Such a nesting represents a request to log in which requires a request-response for, say, a password before the log-in response is made. Figure 8c shows an example of another nesting-the pair (105, 205) within the pair (102,202). Such a nesting within the message sequence (which does not result in nested arcs) illustrates how the database access request gets passed along to become a CDB, in the form of a request-response pair (105,205). 6.7.1. Examples of Message Sequences. Presented below are some examples that illustrate the flow of message sequences through MULTISAFE. Accompanying these examples are figures that show the message direction, message type, and nesting of messages. Message nesting is depicted by loops. Some of these loops are illustrated with a dashed line that connects the request message with its corresponding response message when other pairs are embedded.
User-Initiated Message Sequences. The first example, in Figure 9 , illustrates a message sequence for the log message type. Using the SMC numbers, the order of the messages in this message sequence is as follows: In this message sequence, representing a log-in check, the first nested pair (104, 204) is a request and a response for a password. The first password was incorrect, in this example, and the PSM had to make a second request for the password. Once the PSM has the correct password, the log-in check (which is the initial system occupancy check) is completed (at the point on the PSM line between the adjacent 204 and 201 messages) and the user is allowed onto the system. If the second password had also been incorrect and the user was not allowed on the system, the message sequence in Figure 9 would not have changed. Only the message text for response 201 and the user status in the PSM would be changed. (The number of times a user can attempt to enter the correct password is determined by the authorizer and is not limited by MULTISAFE.) Figure 10 illustrates the message sequence for query processing in which several blocks of data are retrieved and passed to the user. The message sequence begins with the UAM response to the PSM's USEUEQUEST call with a 102 message, asking for database access. The PSM copies the 102 text from the UAM's memory to its memory. At this point, the binding of the database access request takes place (i.e., the access request text can no longer be modified by the user). Next, the PSM performs data-independent security checking. This is done by the CHECK1 function in PSM-P. For this user request, it was necessary to reauthenticate the user's identity, using the (104, 204) messages. After clearing CHECKl, the PSM calls the SERVICE function, initiating the 105 message. The SRM retrieves the blocks of data from the database and returns them to the PSM for data-dependent checking (205). For this particular query the PSM needs additional information from the database before data-dependent checking is completed by the EXTRACT function. The message pair (106,206) furnishes the PSM with the needed data. The PSM completes its security checking and passes these blocks of data (202) to the UAM. Sometimes blocks of data are not authorized. This can result in only certain blocks of data being passed on to the UAM and the user. In such a situation, given a partial enforcement policy [26] , the EXTRACT function deletes these unauthorized blocks and the unauthorized data venture no further than the PSM.
If the volume of data retrieved from the database is large, multiple 205 messages may occur. Instead of waiting for all the data, the SERVICE function will return some of these blocks so that the EXTRACT function can be processing them while the SERVICE function is retrieving more blocks.
It is possible for data access attempts to be denied by the system occupancy check. As an example of how the system occupancy check denies a data access, consider the case mentioned earlier in which the user is allowed to occupy the system only between 8:00 A.M. and 590 P.M. A potential penetrator logs in just before 5:OO P.M. in hopes of returning later, when the office is empty, to print a hard copy of an "eyes-only" file-an action which could readily be detected by co-workers during normal working hours. In this example, the plan could be defeated by the system occupancy check which can rebind the log-in condition (just before the 105,106, or 202 on the PSM line in Figure 10 ) at each request.
Authorizer-Initiated Message Sequences An authorizer is a user who is authorized to grant and revoke privileges for access to some of the system resources. Authorizers also set the conditions under which these accesses can take place. Illustrated in Figure 11 is a message sequence for processing a request to display some authorization information (stored in the PSM database as a result of previous authorizations). The UAM makes a request to the PSM (103) for the authorization information to be displayed. In the process of evaluating and checking the request, the PSM needs (in this example) some authentication information from the authorizer to verify his or her identity, thus the (104, 204) sequence. The authentication process is completed, along with any system occupancy checks, between the adjacent 204 and 203 messages on the PSM line. (Notice that the SERVICE and EXTRACT functions are used as in the case of database access; the main difference is that the PSM database is accessed instead of the SRM database.) If the enforcement procedure governing the authorizer's actions determines that the authorizer has the right to see the requested information, then the authorizer's display request is honored through the 203 message. Otherwise, the authorizer's display request is ignored and he or she is notified via the 203 message. A message sequence for changing authorizations follows a pattern similar to that of the display.
FUTURE WORK
Ongoing and future work includes extensions, in several directions, of the work described in this paper. For example, an analysis of cost and performance is being undertaken. Simulation is being used to study both feasibility and performance. Petri nets are being applied to model the asynchronous concurrent processes and are being considered as a means of verifying certain aspects of message security.
